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By Kazuhito IKEO* 
I Why is the Capital Structure of Banks Relevant? 
The capital structure of corporations is not really an important issue when the me-
chanism of arbitrage in the capital markets works well. In contrast to the generally 
accepted idea, this is what the standard theory of finance asserts. 
For example, <iuppose that issuing bonds is beneficial to a corporation, because 
an increase in the debt ratio has the effect of reducing corporate taxes under the tax 
code in the United States or Japan. As a result, if a significant amount of bonds 
is issued, the effective rate of return on the bonds has naturally to become higher 
than those of other types of assets. The bonds could not be smoothly placed without 
such a relative rise of the effective rate of return on them. This change in the rate of 
return, however, lowers the benefit of issuing bonds as against other financing methods 
and imposes limitations on new issues of bonds. In the opposite, the same adjustment 
mechanism should work in the opposite way so that debt financing and equity financ-
ing will be indifferent for individual corporations after such adjustments have been 
completed. 
A view like this was proposed by Miller (1977) and is the most vital revival of the 
irrelevancy theorem of capital structure since Modigliani and Miller (1958). In the 
case that there exist some costs associated with issuing debt (e.g. the devaluation of the 
value of tax shields other than debt, agency costs including bankruptcy related costs 
and so on), debt financing and equity financing will not be fully indifferent for indi-
vidual corporations and a level of optimum debt ratio may exist. I) Even in this case, 
however, it is obviously unprofitable to raise debt ratios thoughtlessly. 
The case of banks is different from the one of corporations in general and it should 
not be correct to apply the above-mentioned irrelevancy theorem to banks without 
any modification. This is because banks are 'special' in the sense of being protected 
by the government. To put it concretely, the following two factors can be pointed out 
as those mitigating against the direct applicability of the irrelevancy theorem. 
First, the possibility of a corporation's default increases as its debt ratio is raised, 
provided that its assets composition remains unchanged. Therefore, when the debt 
ratio is raised, in order just to keep the effective rate of return constant, it is indispen-
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics, Kyoto University. 
1) Kim (1988) gives a discerning summary of the current state of the theory of capital structure. 
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sable to raise the contractual rate of interest. As far as the purchasers of debt them-
selves have to bear the risk of default, they wiIl never accept an increase in the debt 
ratio without a corresponding rise in the contracutal rate of interest. However, the 
security of debts issued by banks (especially, bank deposits) is officially and tacitly secur-
ed by the government") so that the purchasers of bank debt are exempted from bear-
ing the risk of default. For this reason, increasing the banks' debt ratios does not 
necessarily require raising the contractual rate of interest. This means that the higher 
the debt ratio becomes, the lower the effective cost of debt issued by a bank is. 
Secondly, the operation of the payment system is treated as a business which is 
exclusively assigned to banks by government regulations. As the result, banks seem to 
be enjoying a kind of monopolistic power, at least in providing payment accounts. 
On the other hand, banks are not given special treatment when they raise funds in the 
stock market. In other words, there, they have to compete with other business cor-
porations on an equal playing field. Because of this, it is considered that banks can 
raise funds by issuing (demand) deposits with relatively lower costs than by issuing 
equity. 
From these two factors, there arises the tendency for it to be profitable for a bank 
to raise debt ratio (or decrease capital ratio). As a matter of fact, it has been observed 
both in Japan and the United States that the capital ratios of banks have .. .tended to 
become lower until the regulatory requirements on the capital of banks were recently 
strengthened. 
In summary, banks are given an incentive to decrease their capital ratios through 
the provision of public protection so that some direct intervention (i.e. regulation) by 
the government will be required for keeping the specific (relatively high) capital ratio 
of banks. In this sense, it is not sufficient to discuss the capital restrictions on banks 
by itself. The capital restrictions ·on banks should be put into perspecitve in connec-
tion with the system of government regulations on banks. 
n Concept of Fair Capital Ratio 
The second factor mentioned above should become weaker as competition between 
banks or between banks and nonbank corporations becomes more intensive with pro-
gress in the liberalization of financial activities. Even if the second factor could be 
completely eliminated, banks would have an incentive to lower their capital ratios, 
to the extent that the first factor mentioned above still remains. Therefore, in this 
paper, I discuss the effect of bank capital regulations solely in connection with the 
first factor, and neglect the existence of the second one. 
In order to get an intuitive understanding, and ignoring how to measure the a-
2) In the case of Japan, the refund of deposits up to ten million yen per depositor is formally secured 
under the Deposit Insurance Law. In adrlition, it is widely believed from the government attitude 
to previous bank failures that the broader range of bank obligations is substantially guaranteed by 
the government. 
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mount of risk, let R be the amount of risk incurred by a bank and C be the portion of 
the risk assumed by the capital of the bank. This expression may lack a certain degree 
of logical strictness, but it facilitates the understanding of the basic concept. In ad-
dition, consider that, for simplicity, the whole of bank liabilities is secured by the go-
vernment. In that case holders of the bank debt, including depositors, bear no risk 
and the remaining risk is borne by the government. Accordingly, let us denote the 
portion of the risk the government assumes by G. By definition, 
G=R-C(orR=C+G). 
Now, we assume that all of G,R and C are measured in money terms. In that case, 
the value of G indicates the economic value of the government guarantee on the liabi-
lities of the bank. In other words, G is the value of (benefits which the bank receives 
from the existence of) deposit insurance. The concept of deposit insurance is broadly 
defined in this paper to contain any kind of government gurantee on bank liabilities.") 
Although banks are secured for thie debt, they are subject to at the same time bur-
dens in exchange for the government guarantee. The most typical example of such 
burdens is the payment of deposit insurance premiums. Besides this, banks bear other 
indirect costs such as the assmupiton of periodical reporting duties on their activities 
and so on. Let us assume that the total opportunity cost of the direct and indirect 
burdens is P, which we will simply call the deposit insurance premium. 
If the total amount of risk imposed on its capital and the deposit insurance premium 
(i.e. C+P) is equal to the amount of risk assumed by the bank (R), it is judged that the 
bank assumes all of the risk substantially on its own responsibility. On the other hand, 
if R> C +P, a part of the risk assumed by the bank is shifted to the government at no 
cost. This means that the bank is in effect awarded subsidies. (Conversely, if R< 
C+P, the bank is subject to taxes.) The condition R=C+P is equivalent to G=P 
(the value of deposit insurance is equal to its premium), since R=C+G as mentioned 
above. 
From this reasoning, it can be asserted that, when Rand P are regarded as prede-







3) In Japan, in contrast to the situation in the United States, the deposit insurance system strictly 
defined occupies only an ancillary position in the provisions system of government gurantee against 
debts of banks. The core of the provisions system seems to be reSCue activities administered by 
the Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan· For the convenience of terminology, however, the 
provisions system as a whole is refereed to as "deposit insurance" in this paper. 
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tal. To put it another way, when the actual amount of capital is equal to the fair a-
mount of capital, the bank is said to take risk on its own responsibility. In this sense, 
when the capital of a bank is more than the fair amount, the capital of the bank can be 
said to be adequate. The definition of capital adequacy of banks as stated below is 
based on just this point of view. 
Capital is adequate either when it reduces the chances of future insolvency of 
an institution to a predetermined minimum level or, alternatively, when the pre-
mium paid by the bank to an insurer is "fair"; that is, when it fully covers the 
risks borne by the insurer. (Maisel (1981)) 
It can be also inferred from what we have already discussed that, if there is no 
restriction, banks can obtain profits (in the form of substantial subsidies) by lowering 
capital ratios. The capital regulations are laid down in order to prevent banks from 
doing this. However, the current capital regulations function only in the form of 
setting the minimum standards of capital ratios which banks must satisfy. This may 
induce another form of undesirable behavior of banks under the current system of 
deposit insurance premiums. 
In other words, because deposit insurrance premiums are proportional to the a-
mount of liabilities under the current insurance premium system (a fixed premium 
rate system), such a uniform setting of the minimum standards (causes actual capital 
rations to stick to the minimum levies and) makes C and P per unit of assets constant. 
Accordingly, the increase of R per unit of assets easily results in R>C+P and banks can 
thereby obtain substantial subsidies. Capital regulations in this form may therefore 
induce banks to take excessive risk. 
Generally, this is nothing other than what is known as the moral hazard ef-
fect caused by the provision of deposit insurance at fixed premiums. As a means of 
removing such undesirable effects, it has even been proposed to introduce a risk-based 
system of deposit insurance premiums under which P is adjusted with changes of R in 
order to always maintain the relation of R=C+P. 
Strictly speaking, however, the effect of inducing banks to take excessive risk is 
not caused only by the fixed premium rate system alone. This effect only occurs in 
conjunct with the capital regulations that require establishing fixed standards of capi-
tal ratio. Therefore, the effect can be removed by varying C along with changes of 
R in order to always preserve the relation of R=C+P, even under the condition of 
keeping P constant. In other words, the moral hazard effect can also be removed by 
introducing a risk-based system of capital ratio standards. Such a risk-based system 
of capital ratio standards can be said to be a dual one to the above-mentioned risk-
based system of deposit insurance premiums.4) 
4) Because the essential thing is to maintain the relation of R=C+P, the pure forms of the risk-based 
system of deposit insurance premiums or the risk-based system of capital ratio standards are not 
necessarily required. Any suitable hybrid of these two systems can do the same joh. 
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Governors of central banks of the Group of Ten Countries (G 10) gathered at the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel in July 1988. They unanimously 
approved the report on "International Convergence of Capital Measurment and Capi-
tal Standards" proposed by the "Cook Committee on Banking Regulations and Super-
visory Practices" and decided to introduce new capital requirements based upon the 
contents of this report. The new capital requirements established by this Basel Ac-
cord (hereinafter referred to as the "BIS capital requiremnets") have adopted the 
concept of the above-mentioned risk-based system of capital ratio standards. The 
BIS capital requirements are fundamentally different from existing capital regulations 
in this regard. This point is concretely shown by the fact that the BIS capital require-
ments use a risk weight method. 
In the Cook committee's report, five grade risk weights of 0, 10, 20, 50 and 100% 
were determined and it was decided which risk weight should be applied to each classifica-
tion of assets, although some details were delegated to the discretion of each national 
authority. For example, respective risk weights such as 0 % for short-term bonds is-
sued by central governments, 50% for residential mortgages and 100% for commer-
cialloans were prescribed. 
Furthermore, off-balance sheet activities are taken into account based on two 
points. One is the category of the off-balance sheet activities. Conversion ratios are 
prescribed for several categories of off-balance sheet activities. The other factor is 
who is the transaction partner of the activities. Which of the risk weights that should 
be applied is decided according to the transaction partner. To sum up, the transac-
tion volumes of each off-balance sheet activities are transformed into the equivalent 
amounts of risk assets by multiplying the transaction volumes of off-balance sheet ac-
tivities both by an applicable conversion ratio and a risk weight. 
Suppose that a bank owns n kinds of assets and denote the amount of each asset 
by A, while the value of the risk weight to be applied to the asset is w, (i=1,2, ... ,n). 
Further, suppose that the bank is engaged in m kinds of off-balance sheet activities and 
denote the transaction volume of each activity by D j and the value of the risk weight 
multiplied by the applicable conversion ratio by Zj (j=I,2, ... ,m). Then, the total 
amount of assets on the balance sheet of this bank is ::8A" while the total amount of 
risk assets to be used as the denonimator when the capital ratio of the bank is measured 
in the BIS capital requirements is ::E wjA, +::E zjD j. Therefore, we define 
(1) ::8w,A,+::EzjPj cu = ::8 A, 
and refer to (0 as the average risk weight. 
On the other hand, the concept of capital consists of two categories; that is, core 
capital and supplementary capital. The former means equities and capital reserves 
while the latter includes (at most 45% of) unrealized capital gain on securities (or 
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hidden reserve), allowance being made for bad performance debt and subordinate debts. 
However, the excess of the amount of supplementary capital above the amount of 
core capital is not counted as required capital. In short, let the core capital be T, 
and the supplementary capital be T2, then T-min (2 T"T,+T2) will be the amount of 
the required capital used as the numerator when the capital ratio is measured accord-
ing to the BIS requirements. 
In the Basel Accord, it was agreed among bank supervisory authorities of the 
G-IO countries that the condition 
(2) 
should be satisfied by the end of fiscal 1992 at latest. The value of the left side ofequa-
tion (2) is refereed to as the risk assets ratio. By equation (I), however, equation 
(2) is equivalent to the followng equation: 
(3) T ---=::'-:-> 0.08 OJ • 
:2JAi 
The value of the left side of equation (3) corresponds to what is called a gearing 
ratio in the conventional capital regulations. Therefore, the average risk weight OJ 
can be interpreted as the measure of bank risks implicitly employed by the BIS capi-
tal requirements. That is, as can be seen from equation (3), any bank with a high 
average risk weight must raise its capital ratio as measured by the gearing ratio under 
the BIS requirements. This is nothing other than the judgement that the higher the 
value of 00 is, the larger the risk (per unit of assets on the balance sheet) of a bank is. 
Although Wi is always less than or equal to one, the value of 00 is not necessarily small-
er than or equal to one. As seen from equation (I), banks which are actively engag-
ed in off-balance sheet activities, e.g. US money center banks, may attain a value of 
00 greater than I. 
In summary, while the minimum standards of capital ratios are constant irrespec-
tive of the value of 00 under the conventional regulations, under the BIS requirements 
the standards are adjusted in proportion to the value of 00. Therefore, if the value 
of the average risk weight 00 appropriately reflects the true risk (per unit of assets) of 
banks, the BIS requirements can be regarded as constituting a risk-based system of 
capital ratio standards which suppresses the moral hazard effect. In other words, 
how desirable the BIS capital requirements are depends upon how appropriate 00 is 
as a measure of bank risk. 
However, a few questions must be raised concerning the appropriateness of ro as 
a measure of the risk of banks. The first question arises, because risk weights adopted 
in the BIS requirements are measured only roughly in five grades, so that there may 
be a considerable difference in the risks among assets to which the same risk weight is 
applied. For example, all commercial loans are subject to the weight of 100 %, but 
there is no banker who thinks that the risks of all commercial loans are the same. 
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Secondly, the method of calculating the amount of risk assets is based on the as-
sumption that risks are additive. It is well known, however, that there is a merit of 
diversified investments and that such risks are sub-additive. That is, as for regarding 
the standard deviation of the rates of return on assets as an indicator of risk, the risk 
of portfolio investments is less than the simple sum of the risks of the constituent as-
sets. The only exception is the case where the correlation coefficient between the rates 
of return on all the constituent assets is unity. We are, therefore, inclined to wonder 
whether the method of calculation adopted in the BIS requirements disregards an ele-
mentary principle of portfolio selection theory.') 
In the light of these questions, there is a high probability that co, the average risk 
weight, is not an appropriate measure of risk for banks. Nevertheless, the question of 
how appropriate co is as a measure must finally be judged by experience. Even though 
there are deficiencies in the theoretical foundations of the BIS requirements, that does 
not automatically remove the possibility of co being useful in practice within the limits 
of approximation. I will try to address this empirical problem by measuring risk for 
banks using an alternative method and then compare the results with those obtained by 
using the method in the BIS requirements. 
IV Application of an Option Pricing Model 
The alternative method adopted here is that applying an option pricing mode! and 
5) Among indexes of risk, betas as used by CAPM satisfiy additivity. In other words, it is a sufficient 
condition for making risk assets an accurate measure of portfolio risk that risk weights are set in 
proportion to the betas. 
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calculating the amount of risk for banking activities on the basis of the stock prices of 
banks. The basic assumption for this method to be effective is tha t the stock prices 
of banks are formed in a manner such that actual conditions of the banks' activities are 
correctly evaluated, or the stock market for banks is information ally efficient. At the 
same time, various possibilities of distortion must be pointed out concerning the stock 
price formation of banks in Japan. Unfortunately, no close and precise examination 
of the efficiency of stock price formation of banks in Japan has ever been made up to now. 
The present paper will simply avoid dealing with this matter and assume efficiency of 
the stock price formation of banks. 
Denote the corporate value of a bank by V and assume that the movement of V 
will be subject to the following stochastic process (geometric Brownian process) : 
(4) dV= /loy Vdt+a y Vdz 
where t denotes time (in units of years) and z is the standard Wiener process. In this 
expression, ay shows the (instantaneous) standard deviation of rate of changes in the 
corporate value and is used as a measure of risk for banking activities. 
In addition, assume that the deposit insurance policy of the government is as fol-
lows: The government inspects banks on site once a year. At the time of inspection, 
if it is found that the corporate value of a bank is less than the amount of outstanding 
liabilities (B), i.e. its net wealth is negative, the government immediately orders the 
bank to close and refunds the full amount of the bank's outstanding obligations to all 
its creditors. If it is not negative, a bank is entitled to continue its business. 
Under such a deposit insurance policy, the value of the deposit insurance (G) re-
ceived by an unclosed bank just after the last inspection can be derived from the Black 
and Scholes's option pricing formula·) as follows: 
(5) 
(6) 
G= BN( -x+ay) -VN( -x), 
x= In (VIB) + ay , 
a y 2 
where N ( ) is a cumulative standard normal distrubution function. 
While a y and V are not directly observable7), thier values can be indirectly deriv-
ed from stock data. Stocks can be regarded as call options on corporate value. Let 
the aggregate value of stocks be S and the (instantaneous) standard deviation of chang-
ing rate of the value be as. Then, on the assumption of efficient price formation, the 
following relations can be expected to hold. 
(7) S = VN(x) -BN(x-ay), 
6) Although deposit insurance and put options are certainly deferent in their appearance, they share 
the same logical structure. This fact was first pointed out by Merton (1977). For the details of 
reasoning in the main text, refer to Chapter Five of Ikeo (1990). 
7) The sum of the values of stocks (S) and liabilities (B) is not euqal to the corporate value (V) given 
the existence of deposit insurance, but to V plus G. 
(8) 
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Consequently, the value of V and "v can be obtained from the data B, Sand "s 
by solving equations (7) and (8) as simultaneous equations. Then, the value of de-
posit insurance for a bank can be calculated by substituting the value of V and "v into 
equation (5). Further, we can obtain the fair rate of deposit insurance for the bank 
by dividing this value by the deposit balance (D). If this fair rate of deposit insurance 
differs from the actual rate of deposit insurance (at present 0.012 % in Japan), the bank 
is either in a state of under-capitalization (in the case that the fair rate is more than the 
actual rate) or over-capitalization (in the opposite case). 
As a second step, we can calculate how much capital should be poured in or re-
mvoed in order to let the fair rate of deposit insurance and the actual rate of the insurance 
coincide under a constant balance of obligation, assuming that capital changes in 
the form of a homologous enlargement or curtailment of existing portfolio (i.e. without 
changing "v). The value of capital ratio when such an amount of capital is actually 
changed is the fair capital ratio. The calculation procedure of estimation made in 
this paper is just like the one above.8) 
We chose as estimation points the end of March 1989 and the end of March 1990,9) 
because these Were the latest points for which data could be obtained when the re-
search was done. Of the data required, balances of liabilities and deposits were col-
lected from "Analysis of Financial Statements of Banks in Japan" compiled by the 
Federation of Bankers' Associations of Japan while the stock prices and total numbers 
of outstanding stocks were taken from the "Data Book on Stock Prices", an extra num-
ber of Toyo Keizai. Data on monthly rates of earnings on stocks were collected from 
"Rates of Earning in Stock Investment" by the Japan Securities Research Institute. 
Finally, the annual rates of standard deviation of rates of earnings on stocks were esti-
mated by using data for the 36 months from January 1986 to December 1988 as well 
as for the 36 months from January 1987 to December 1989. Each estimated value was 
used as the value of "s as of March 1989 and 1990 respectively. 
The last step implicitly depends on the assumption that the expectation of volati-
lity of stock prices is formed in a static manner. This assumption is not a desirable one. 
If We select the estimation point at an earlier time, data after the point are available 
and it becomes possible to adopt the assumption, in the spirit of the rational expecta-
tion hypothesis, that expectation is equal to actual result. However, since this paper 
aims principally at comparison with the BIS requirements, it is not suitable for its pur-
pose to select the estimation point too early. For this reason, it was received to adopt 
the above assumption. Further, given the limitations on the data, it was also assum-
ed that the book values of liabilities and deposits were equal to their market values. 
8) This procedure is basically due to Ronn and Verma (1989). 
9) March is the last month of the fiscal year in Japan. 
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V Results of Estimation 
Table 1 and 2 arrange the results of estimates on thirteen city banks (Mitsui Bank 
and Taiyo-Kobe Bank are handled separatelylO»). Columns [2] and [3] of the respec-
tive tables show the values of V and <Tv obtained by solving the simultaneous equations 
(7) and (8). The value of G was calculated by substituting these vlaues into equation 
(5) and the fair rates of deposit insurance shown in column [4] were obtained by divid-
ing G by the balance of deposits. Column [5] is the resulting increase (or decrease, 
if the sign is negative) in capital amount necessary to eliminate the gap between the 
fair rate of deposit insurance and the actual rate of the insurance. 
The data in column [5] show that eight city banks among the thirteen have neg-
ative signs at the end of March 1989 and that the total of the data is also negative. 
The data for the end of March 1990 show that eleven banks among the thirteen have 
negative signs and that the total is again negative. These results show that, as far as 
the deposit insurance policy of the government is as assumed in the previous section, 
the city banks as a whole have enough capital. 
Now, let us compare these results with those for the case in which the BIS capital 
requirements are applied. Tables 3 and 4 present data concerning the BIS capital 
requirements at the end of March for 1989 and 1990 respectively. The amounts ofrisk 
assets (2]w;A;+~JzjOj in the symbols used in this paper) in column [2] and the risk 
assets ratios in column [5] were collected from annual securities reports. The data 
Table 1 March 19B9 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Name of bank Corporate Oy (%) Fair rate of Necessary 
value . deposit .capital 
(billion yen) msurance mcrease 
(%) (billion yen) 
Daiichi-Kangyo 62169.5 5.B5 0.007B -412.7 
Sumitomo 61473.7 6.53 0.0122 20.7 
Fuji 59059.6 6.0B 0.0075 -435.7 
Mitsubishi 56601.1 5.4B 0.0049 -716.9 
Sanwa 53703.2 5.BB 0.03B7 1052.3 
Tokai 35041.2 3.90 0.0005 -1111.4 
Mitsui 324B4.4 5.07 0.0079 -IB5.3 
Tokyo 2B747.6 4.45 0.010B -36.9 
Taiya-Kobe 25942.9 4.3B 0.0301 315.9 
Daiwa 17232.7 5.86 0.0239 194.1 
Kyowa 15750.B 4.09 0.0148 39.7 
Saitama 14792.2 3.57 0.0020 -261.0 
Hokkaido- 11322.1 3.23 0.0038 -119.8 
Takushoku 
10) These two banks merged in April, 1990. 
[I] 
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[2] [3] [4] 






increase (billion yen) 
(%) (billion yen) 
Daiichi.Kangyo 72233.7 3.87 0.0045 -777.0 
Sumitomo 69063.9 4.25 0.0026 -1197.3 
Fuji 68643.6 4.87 0.0078 -397.9 
Mitsubishi 66255.9 3.94 0.0031 -958.5 
Sanwa 64480.8 5.21 0.0325 971.1 
Tokai 40998.4 2.61 0.0003 -1038.1 
Mitsui 37867.4 3.91 0.0033 -523.1 
Tokyo 33733.3 2.97 0.0047 -269.6 
Taiyo-Kobe 30727.3 4.24 0.0335 409.9 
Daiwa 20344.8 3.88 0.0044 -222.9 
Kyowa 17591.6 3.62 0.0070 -100.5 
Saitama 17629.3 2.47 0.0007 -351. 7 
Hokkaido- 12566.8 3.30 0.0029 -165.3 
Takushoku 
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on total assets (~A;) in column [3] was obtained from tbe "Analysis of Financial Sta-
tements of Banks in Japan" by the Federation of Bankers' Associations of Japan as in 
the case of outstanding liabilities. Average risk weights in column [4] were obtained 
by dividing the values of column [2] by the values of column [3] according to equation 
(I) . 
Table 3 March 1989 
[I] [2] [3] [4] [51 
Name of bank Risk assets Assets OJ BIS 
(billion yen) (billion yen) standard 
I 
(%) 
Daiichi-Kangyo 35181. 5 54280.6 0.65 8.23 
Sumitomo 34173.1 52962.2 0.65 8.30 
Fuji 34220.4 51229.0 0.67 8.32 
Mitsubishi 32157.9 49619.7 0.65 8.36 
Sanwa 31674.1 48210.8 0.66 7.79 
Tokai 21038.0 31424.2 0.67 7.67 
Mitsui 20757.7 29040.1 0.71 7.33 
Tokyo 18353.9 26106.4 0.70 6.96 
Taiya-Kobe 16784.8 24134.1 0.70 7.57 
Daiwa 10643.4 15382.4 0.69 8.70 
Kyowa 9929.9 14627.0 0.68 7.91 
Saitama 8883.1 13633.9 0.65 8.45 
Hokkaido- 7129.4 10579.8 0.67 7.27 
Takushoku 
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Table 4 March 1990 
[1] [2] [3] [1] I [5] 
Name of bank Risk assets Assets OJ BIS 
(billion yen) (biJIion yen) standard 
(%) 
Daiichi-Kangyo 43789.2 66590.8 0.66 8.28 
SUloitomo 42679.2 62773.4 0.68 8.44 
Fuji 41780.7 61895.0 0.68 8.24 
Mitsubishi 38904.0 60673.3 0.64 8.46 
Sanwa 39109.8 58982.6 0.66 8.46 
Tokai 26399.4 38480.7 0.69 7.72 
Mitsui 24912.0 34634.3 0.72 6.91 
Tokyo 22247.2 31816.3 0.70 8.02 
Taiyo-Kobe 19528.6 28712.4 0.68 7.23 
Daiwa 13273.2 18770.8 0.71 8.42 
Kyowa 11322.4 16471.9 0.69 8.83 
Saitama 11006.6 I 16735.5 0.66 8.27 
Hokkaido- 8333.7 I 11752.3 0.71 8.50 
Takushoku I 
As seen from column [5] in Tables 3 and 4, there were only six banks among the 
thirteen city banks that met 8 percent final BIS standard requirement as of the end of 
March 1989 while nine banks met it as of the end of March 1990. Comparing these 
results with column [5] of Tables I and 2, a difference in evaluation is found for six 
banks at the end of March, 1989, and for three banks at the end of March, 1990. In 
other words, while the results of the estimation obtained in this paper show that these 
banks have enough capital (or not enough capital), they are judged to be insufficient 
in capital (or to have enough capital) from the standpoint of the BIS requirements. 
Considering that sample includes only 13 banks, we must say that this is not a negli-
gible discrepancy. 
The discrepancy is partially due to the fact that different definitions of capital 
are used, but main cause of it is the difference in the evaluation of risk for banks. The 
correlation coefficients between 00, which is a measure of risk in the BIS requirements, 
and <Tv, which is the measure used in this paper, is -0.266 as of the end of March 1989 
and -0.174 as of the end of March 1990. At least, these results show that these two 
measures can not both be appropriate at the same time. 
Of course, the esitmation in this paper is obtained on the basis of many restrictive 
assumptions. Most imporantly, it is based on the assumption that the stock price for-
mation of banks reflects the fundamentals of banking activities. There is a possibili-
ty that this assumption is contrary to reality and that the estimated values in this pa-
per are therefore not appropriate. In that sense, it is proper to say that the above-
mentioned results show the difficulty in objectively measuring the risk for banks. 
However, considering with the above-mentioned problems about the theoretical 
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basis of the risk measruing method in the BIS requirements, it can also be said that the 
above results increase the doubts about appropriateness of the current BIS method. 
To reiterate, the BIS requirements pay more attention to the incentive effect for 
banking activities as compared to conventional regulations. This is shown by the 
fact that they adopt the notion ofthe risk-based system of capital ratio standard. How-
ever, in order that such consideration may actually produce a better result, the risk of 
banking activities as a whole must be measured appropriately. It is the conclusion 
of this paper that the current efforts of banking regulators leave wide room for im-
provement in this regard. 
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